Economic Scene
New York
Times
Some Countries Remain Resistant to
American Cultural Exports
By TYLER COWEN
Published:
February 22, 2007
American movies
and music have done very well in some countries like Sweden and less well in
others like India.
This may sound like a simple difference in human tastes, but decisions to
consume culture have an economic aspect.
Loyalties to
cultural goods and services — be it heavy metal music
or the opera — are about social networking and choosing an identity and an
aspiration. That is, we use culture to connect with other people and to define
ourselves; both are, to some extent, economic decisions. The continuing and
indeed growing relevance of local economic connections suggests that cultural
imperialism will not prove to be the dominant trend.
Local culture
commands loyalty when people are involved in networks of status and caste, and
they pursue religious and communal markers of identity. Those individuals use
local cultural products to signal their place in hierarchies.
An Indian
Muslim might listen to religious Qawwali music to set
himself apart from local Hindus, or a native of Calcutta might favor songs from
Bengali cinema. The Indian music market is 96 percent domestic in origin, in
part because India is such a large and multifaceted society. Omar Lizardo, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Notre Dame, explains this logic
in his recent paper “Globalization and Culture: A Sociological Perspective.”
Today, economic
growth is booming in countries where American popular culture does not
dominate, namely India and China. Population growth is strong in many Islamic
countries, which typically prefer local music and get their news from sources
like the satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera.
The combination
of these trends means that American entertainment, for largely economic
reasons, will lose relative standing in the global marketplace. In fact,
Western culture often creates its own rivals by bringing creative technologies
like the recording studio or the printing press to foreign lands.
American
popular culture tends to be popular when people interact with others from
around the world and seek markers of global identity. My stepdaughter spent
last summer studying French in Nice, with students from many other countries.
They ate and hung out at McDonald’s, a name
and symbol they all share, even though it was not everyone’s favorite meal.
Globalization
is most likely to damage local culture in regions like Scandinavia that are
lightly populated, not very hierarchical and looking for new global cultural
symbols. But the rest of the world’s population is in countries — China and
India, of course, but also Brazil, Mexico, Egypt and Indonesia — that do not fit
that description.
“American”
cultural products rely increasing on non-American talent and international
symbols and settings. “Babel,” which won this year’s Golden Globe for best
drama, has a Mexican director, and is set in Morocco, Japan and Mexico, mostly
with non-English dialogue.
Hollywood
movies are popular in Europe in part because of the successes of European
welfare states and of European economic integration. Western Europe has become
more equal in its treatment of citizens, it has moved away from an aristocratic
class society, and it has strong global connections. All those factors favor an
interest in American and global popular culture; Hollywood movies often capture
70 percent or more of a typical European cinematic market. Social democracy,
which the Europeans often hold up in opposition to the American model, in fact
aided this cultural invasion by making Europe more egalitarian.
Many smaller
countries have been less welcoming of cultural imports. It is common in Central
America for domestically produced music to command up to 70 percent of market
share. In Ghana, domestic music has captured 71 percent of the market,
according to Unesco
figures. Critics of cultural imperialism charge that rich cultures dominate
poor ones. But the data supplied by Professor Lizardo
show that the poorer a country, the more likely it will buy and listen to its
own domestic music. This makes sense given that music is a form of social
networking and the relevant networks are primarily local.
That said, the poorest countries don’t produce many of the films they
watch. Making a movie costs much more than cutting an album. So as the world
becomes richer, the relative market share of Hollywood movies will probably
fall more than the relative market share of American popular music.
Furthermore, moviegoers are starting to look to Bollywood
films, or other Asian productions, rather than Hollywood, for their markers of
global identity.
The complaint
of “cultural imperialism” is looking increasingly implausible. As I argued in ”Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the
World’s Cultures,” the funk of James
Brown helped shape the music of West Africa; Indian authors draw
upon Charles Dickens; and Arabic pop is centered in France and Belgium. Western
cultural exports are as likely to refresh foreign art forms as to destroy them.
Western technologies — from the metal carving knife to acrylic paint to digital
filmmaking — have spurred creativity worldwide.
Culture is not
a zero-sum game, so the greater reach of one culture does not necessarily mean
diminished stature for others. In the broad sweep of history, many different
traditions have grown together and flourished. American popular culture will
continue to make money, but the 21st century will bring a broad mélange of
influences, with no clear world cultural leader.
Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George
Mason University and co-author of a blog at www.marginalrevolution.com.